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INTRODUCTION
From the marginalization of Native Americans to the bitter rivalry between the North and the South, discrimination within the United States is
not a new phenomenon. For centuries, Americans have discriminated
against one another because they come from different parts of the country.
Northerners have been derogatorily referred to as “Yankees,”1 Southerners2
as “rednecks,”3 Appalachians as “hillbillies,”4 Californians as “hippies” and
“Valley girls,”5 and Native Americans as “redskins.”6 Such discrimination has
had particularly adverse consequences in the employment context due to the
assumptions employers draw from these regional identities. For example,

1 See, e.g., Lindsay E. Leonard, Damned Yankees: Restrictive Covenants That Discriminate
Against Geographic Origin, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 671, 672-73 (2008) (describing a restrictive
covenant that prohibited property from being leased or sold to anyone considered part of the
“Yankee race”).
2 See Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, Jr., The Meritocracy Myth, SOCIATION TODAY,
Spring 2004, available at http://www.ncsociology.org/sociationtoday/v21/merit.htm (describing
“discrimination against Southerners and preference for Yankees” as a form of discrimination that
neutralizes the effects of merit).
3 See PHILIP MARTIN, THE ARTIFICIAL SOUTHERNER: EQUIVOCATIONS AND LOVE
SONGS 34-35 (2001) (citing Reverend Will Campbell, who argues that “rednecks,” defined as poor
rural white Southerners, “are the most discriminated-against folks in America”).
4 See Everett Sizemore, Appalachian Americans: The Invisible Minority, YAHOO! VOICES (Aug.
16, 2005), http://voices.yahoo.com/article/8611/appalachian-americans-invisible-minority-6422.html
(“Appalachians are statistically one of the most exploited and marginalised groups in America.”).
5 See Mary Bucholtz et al., Hella Nor Cal or Totally So Cal?: The Perceptual Dialectology of California, 35 J. ENG. LINGUISTICS 325, 326-27 (2007) (explaining that people typically associate the
“Valley girl” stereotype with “vacuous, silly, airheaded, [and] California” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
6 See Rob Capriccioso, ‘Redskins’ May Have Psychological Impact Beyond Native Americans, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (May 19, 2010), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
article/%25e2%2580%2598redskins%25e2%2580%2599-may-have-psychological-impact-beyond-nativeamericans-22498 (explaining that “[s]ocial science research shows that the use of ethnic slurs like
‘redskin’ perpetuates harmful stereotypes and leads to discrimination” against Native Americans).
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Southerners are frequently seen as less competent, intelligent, and educated,7
which in turn impacts hiring and firing and contributes to a hostile work
environment.
Despite the prevalence of regional animus in the United States, employment discrimination based on regional origin is not currently actionable
under Title VII’s national origin provision.8 Rather, most courts have
interpreted Title VII’s national origin provision narrowly, requiring employees
to point to a sovereign country of origin in order to make out a national
origin discrimination claim. The problem with this country-focused conception of national origin is that it presupposes that nations are homogeneous
when, in reality, nations—especially large ones like the United States—are
composed of divergent subgroups.
Given this problem, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and some courts have begun to broaden the definition of national
origin to include “place of origin.” They have done so in order to move away
from the misguided assumption that sovereignty is required to constitute a
“national origin.” As a result, courts have upheld discrimination claims
where employees traced their national origin to subnational groups in
foreign countries, such as Acadians, Creoles, and Gypsies, as well as Serbians
as part of the former Yugoslavia. However, courts have refused to allow
employees to prove discrimination under Title VII by tracing their national
origin to regions or subnational groups within the United States. Instead,
courts have continued to treat “American” as though it were a homogeneous
national origin.
To better protect employees from employment discrimination, Title
VII’s national origin provision should be taken one step further to include
7 Kayla Elizabeth Anders, The Effects of Dialect, Gender, and Group Identity on Person
Perception (Apr. 24, 2009) (unpublished B.A. thesis, The College of William and Mary), available
at https://digitalarchive.wm.edu/bitstream/handle/10288/1161/Kayla%20Anders%2c%20Honors%20
Thesis%20%282009%29.pdf?sequence=1; see also Jason K. Clark, Cassie A. Eno & Rosanna E.
Guadagno, Southern Discomfort: The Effects of Stereotype Threat on the Intellectual Performance of US
Southerners, 10 SELF & IDENTITY 248, 249, 257-59 (2011), available at http://osil.psy.ua.edu/
pubs/Clark%20et%20al%202011%20-%20Southern%20Discomfort.pdf (studying how negative
stereotypes of “southerners as being uneducated and unintelligent” can impact southern students’
academic performance); Paul Jankowski, Six Ignorant Stereotypes About Middle America, FORBES
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/pauljankowski/2011/10/05/six-ignorant-stereotypesabout-middle-america (explaining that the six most ignorant stereotypes about citizens in “the
New Heartland” is that they are dumb, fat, poor, backward, and conservative, and only like
country music); American Regions & Stereotypes, ENGLISH REPUBLIC, http://englishrepublic.ru/
Topics/AmericanRegions.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (“Americans from other parts of the
United States characterize residents of the Deep South as unintelligent, simple, uncultured, and
intolerant . . . .”).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
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regional discrimination within the United States. The burden of proof
should be on the plaintiff to show that she comes from a region of the
United States with a distinct culture, history, and background. This interpretation would permit Title VII to protect against discrimination occurring
among individuals sharing the same American origin, while keeping national
origin within geographically circumscribed limits.
Part I of this Comment defines national origin under Title VII and describes how an employee may bring a national origin discrimination claim.
Part II critiques the assumption underlying Title VII’s national origin
definition—that nations are homogeneous—by describing the various forms
of employment discrimination that occur within the United States. Part III
summarizes the relevant case law to show that courts have gradually expanded the scope of national origin discrimination protection to encompass some
forms of subnational discrimination, but notes that courts have failed to do
so uniformly. Finally, Part IV critiques recent proposals to amend Title VII
and recommends that Title VII’s national origin provision be reinterpreted
to include regional discrimination.
I. NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
UNDER TITLE VII
A. Definition of “National Origin”
The key federal law prohibiting discrimination in employment is Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 Title VII applies to all public and
private employers with fifteen or more employees10 and prohibits employers
from discriminating on the basis of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.11
Although national origin is among the types of discrimination prohibited
by Title VII, national origin discrimination was not the primary evil the
authors of Title VII intended to combat. Rather, Congress’s main goal was
to prohibit the rampant racial discrimination that had been plaguing African
Americans in the United States for over a century.12 The only reason

9 Id.
10 Id. § 2000e(b).
11 Id. § 2000e-2(a)

(“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin . . . .”).
12 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The language of
Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and
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national origin was ultimately included as a protected class was “because it
was part of the ‘boilerplate’ statutory language of fair employment in
executive orders and legislation preceding the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”13
The fact that Title VII fails to define national origin underscores the
relative unimportance of national origin discrimination in the minds of the
statute’s authors.14 The only semblance of a definition discernible from the
limited legislative history is a statement by Congressman James Roosevelt
of California, in which he explained, “‘[N]ational origin’ means national. It
means the country from which you or your forebears came from. You may
come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any other country.”15
Further, in the fifty years since Title VII’s enactment, the Supreme
Court has only once interpreted the “national origin” provision directly.16 In
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., the Court held that “[t]he term ‘national
origin’ on its face refers to the country where a person was born, or, more
broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came.”17 As is evident
from both the legislative history behind Title VII’s national origin provision
and the sole Supreme Court case interpreting it, “national origin”—at least
at the beginning—was interpreted literally to refer to a specific country.
B. Proving a National Origin Discrimination Claim
An employee seeking to bring a national origin discrimination claim
under Title VII may do so in one of two ways: as a disparate treatment
claim or as a disparate impact claim.
1. Disparate Treatment
A claim of disparate treatment based on national origin arises when an
employer treats an employee differently from the employee’s coworkers

to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”).
13 Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination Under
Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 807 (1994).
14 Joanna Carey Smith, Emerging Issues: National Origin Discrimination in Employment, POPULAR GOV’T, Fall 2002, at 17, 18, available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pg/pgfal02/
article2.pdf.
15 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964); see also Eugenio Abellera Cruz, Note, Unprotected Identities:
Recognizing Cultural Ethnic Divergence in Interpreting Title VII’s ‘National Origin’ Classification, 9
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 161, 177-78 (1998).
16 Perea, supra note 13, at 822.
17 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973), superseded by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (1996), as recognized in Cortezano v. Salin Bank & Trust Co., 680 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2012).
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because of the employee’s national origin.18 Intentional discrimination is the
cornerstone of a disparate treatment claim. Examples of intentional national
origin discrimination abound in the United States, particularly in the
aftermath of September 11th. For example, in Hassan v. City of Ithaca, the
plaintiff—who identified himself as being of “Middle Eastern descent”—
alleged that after September 11, 2001, his employer began disparaging him
because of his national origin, calling him and other individuals of Middle
Eastern descent names such as “sand nigger,” “dune coon,” and “towel
head.”19 The plaintiff also claimed that he received far harsher disciplinary
penalties than non-Middle Eastern employees, even for conduct that had
occurred more than a year before.20 Ultimately, the plaintiff was fired.21 This
case—and other cases like it22—constitutes disparate treatment because the
adverse employment actions in question were taken “because of ” the
employee’s national origin.23
A plaintiff may advance a disparate treatment claim under either a single- or
a mixed-motive theory. Under a single-motive theory, the plaintiff must
show that unlawful discrimination alone was the reason for the adverse
employment actions, following the burden-shifting framework set forth by
the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.24 Initially, a plaintiff
bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima
facie case of discrimination.25 In the context of hiring, for example, a plaintiff

18 See Smith, supra note 14, at 20 (describing the various claims that courts recognize under
Title VII).
19 No. 10-06125, 2012 WL 1190649, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2012).
20 Id. at *2-3.
21 Id. at *2.
22 See, e.g., EEOC v. Spitzer Mgmt., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 2d 851, 863-64 (N.D. Ohio 2012)
(holding that statements made after September 11th, referring to plaintiff as “Chemical Ali,”
“Camel Jockey,” and “Little Terrorist,” were sufficiently severe and pervasive to support a claim of
hostile work environment and constructive discharge); Alawi v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 544 F. Supp.
2d 1171, 1178-79 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (upholding plaintiff ’s national origin discrimination claim
where the employer inquired about plaintiff ’s Middle Eastern origin and opinion of jihad); Elries
v. Denny’s, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 590, 594, 598 (D. Md. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of national origin discrimination based on evidence that the employer
assigned the plaintiff irregular hours, prohibited the plaintiff from speaking Arabic, ordered the
plaintiff to sit in the back of the room, stated he planned to “get rid of all the Arabs,” and,
ultimately, terminated the plaintiff ).
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (describing that it is an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate against an individual “because of such individual’s . . . national
origin” (emphasis added)).
24 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); see also McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing the elements of a disparate treatment
claim and the burdens of proof required of the parties when litigating such a claim).
25 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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could meet this burden by showing (1) that she fell within a recognized
national origin; (2) that she applied for and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite her qualifications, she
was rejected; and (4) that the employer continued to seek equally qualified
applicants or filled the position with someone outside of the plaintiff ’s
national origin group.26 Successfully establishing the prima facie case gives
rise to an inference of discrimination.
In order to rebut the inference of discrimination, the burden then shifts
to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action.27 The defendant need not persuade the court
that she was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. Rather, “[i]t is
sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether [she] discriminated against the plaintiff.”28
Finally, should the defendant succeed in articulating a legitimate reason
for her actions, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant
were not genuine and were merely a pretext for discrimination.29
Despite the clarity of the McDonnell Douglas framework, employment
decisions are rarely made on the basis of a single factor. Rather, “most
employment decisions are the result of the interaction of various factors,
legitimate and at times illegitimate, objective and subjective, rational and
irrational.”30 Recognizing that employment decisions are complex, Congress
amended Title VII in 1991 to allow for a mixed-motive theory for a disparate
treatment claim, providing that “an unlawful employment practice is
established when [a plaintiff ] demonstrates that . . . national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.”31 The Supreme Court interpreted the amended
statute in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa and found that a plaintiff need not
provide direct evidence of discrimination in pursuing a claim under a
mixed-motive theory, explaining that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is not only
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than
direct evidence.”32
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Id. at 802-03.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn. 2003).
Act of Nov. 21, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 107(a), § 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (emphasis
added) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)).
32 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n. 17
(1957)).
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Although the mixed-motive analysis gives plaintiffs more flexibility in
developing a claim against a discriminatory employer who may have been
motivated by factors other than national origin, this flexibility comes at a
cost: in mixed-motive cases, Title VII affords employers a limited affirmative defense. If an employer can “demonstrat[e] that [she] would have taken
the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,” the
jury may limit a plaintiff ’s remedies to certain types of injunctive relief and
attorney’s fees.33
2. Disparate Impact
Unlike disparate treatment claims, disparate impact claims do not require
proof of a discriminatory motive.34 Rather, disparate impact claims arise
from employment practices that are “facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another.”35 A plaintiff bringing a disparate impact claim grounded in
national origin discrimination need only show that a particular employment
practice, though ostensibly neutral on its face, had a discriminatory effect on
employees of a particular national origin.36 The burden of proof then shifts
to the employer to demonstrate that the employment practice did not have a
disparate impact or, if it did, that the practice was “job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity.”37 Should the
defendant meet this burden, a plaintiff could then prevail only “by showing
there is a less discriminatory alternative.”38
A familiar example of disparate impact discrimination involves the use
of standardized tests.39 For instance, in Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., the employer
instituted an English-only proficiency test for his employees, even though
many employees had limited English language skills.40 Although the
employer did not intend to discriminate, the proficiency tests were still

33
34
35
36
37
38

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n. 15 (1977).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
Id.
EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Firefighters’ Inst. for Racial
Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 220 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000)).
39 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (invalidating the employer’s
use of cognitive tests on the grounds that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. . . . If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited . . . .”).
40 701 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
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actionable under Title VII because the tests had a discriminatory effect on
employees of Hispanic national origins.41
II. TITLE VII’S FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR
SUBNATIONAL DISCRIMINATION
Under Espinoza’s definition of “national origin” as country of ancestry,42
plaintiffs must trace their ethnicity to a sovereign country in order to
prevail on a national origin discrimination claim. This definition is not
sufficient today, as the American workforce has grown more and more
ethnically diverse.43 First, the traditional definition of national origin
erroneously assumes that nations are homogeneous when, in reality, “even
the most seemingly homogeneous ethnic grouping contains cultural subgroups.”44 Second, and related to the first point, the traditional definition
fails to account for the incidence of subnational discrimination that continues
to occur within the United States. As a result, the courts and the EEOC
have interpreted national origin more and more broadly, stopping just short
of a full recognition of subnational discrimination.
A. Title VII’s Flawed Assumption of
Intracountry Homogeneity
Nations are not homogeneous. Rather, most nations are comprised of a
variety of subgroups, each with differing ethnicities. These ethnicities are
characterized by “shared mutable and immutable qualities given at birth
such as race, national origin, ancestry, mother language, religion, shared
history, traditions, values, and symbols, all of which contribute to a sense of
41 See id. at 1142-43 (explaining that although the national origin claims raised in this case
were ultimately unsuccessful, the use of the discriminatory tests by the employer had the potential
to result in the termination of foreign-language speaking employees).
42 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
43 See, e.g., Press Release, United States Census Bureau, An Older and More Diverse Nation
by Midcentury, CB 08-123 (Aug. 14, 2008), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/
releases/archives/population/cb08-123.html (“Minorities, now roughly one-third of the U.S.
population, are expected to become the majority in 2042, with the nation projected to be 54
percent minority in 2050.”); see also Troy D. Thompson, Meltdown in the Melting Pot: The Growth of
National Origin Claims, WIS. EMP. L. LETTER, Mar. 2004 (explaining that in 2002, the EEOC
“received 9,042 charges involving national origin discrimination—a 27 percent increase since 1999”
and that “those claims have remained on the rise”); D.D. Bennett-Alexander & L.P. Hartman,
National Origin Discrimination, MCGRAW-HILL ANSWERS, http://answers.mheducation.com/
management/employment-law/national-origin-discrimination (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (explaining
that “complaints to the EEOC based on alleged national origin discrimination . . . represent the
fastest-growing source of complaints submitted to the EEOC”).
44 Cruz, supra note 15, at 164.
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distinctiveness both for members of the group and for outsiders.”45 Often,
these groups are united by a shared interpretation of their subgroup’s
particular history within the country in which they reside.46
Despite the differences that exist within nations, as originally defined,
national origin represents a singular, uniform identity—an identity that
each individual country possesses and that is shared by all of the country’s
citizens. The problem with the traditional definition of “national origin” is
that it “fails to recognize the cultural differences [that exist] among people
who share the same geographic origin and/or ancestry.”47 Yet, it is these
intracountry differences that have historically resulted in invidious forms of
discrimination.
Examples of intracountry conflict abound in history. One of the most
prominent examples of such subnational tension was the tragic genocide in
Rwanda. In 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed within the
short span of 100 days.48 The violence was a result of historical tension
between the country’s ethnic majority Hutus and minority Tutsis.49 Although
the two groups “speak the same language, inhabit the same areas and follow
the same traditions,” Tutsis are often distinguishable by height and build
from Hutus.50 Further, when Belgian colonists occupied Rwanda in the early
twentieth century, they classified Rwandans by ethnicity and considered
Tutsis to be the superior group.51 As a result, for almost twenty years, Tutsis
“enjoyed better jobs and educational opportunities.”52
Imagine now that there are two American citizens of Rwandan ancestry
working for the same employer. One employee is Tutsi and the other
employee is Hutu. Their employer consistently harasses and verbally abuses
the Hutu employee simply because of her Hutu ancestry, and the Hutu
employee is passed up for a promotion that a less qualified Tutsi employee
receives. Regardless of the invidiousness of the discrimination against the

45
46

Id. at 168.
See Charles F. Keyes, The Dialectics of Ethnic Change, in ETHNIC CHANGE 4, 8 (Charles F.
Keyes ed., 1981) (“What cultural characteristics are marked as emblematic of ethnic identity
depends upon the interpretations of the experiences and actions of mythical ancestors and/or
historical forebears. These interpretations are often presented in the form of myths or legends in
which historical events have been accorded symbolic significance.”).
47 Cruz, supra note 15, at 178.
48 See Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
1288230.stm (last updated Dec. 18, 2008) (detailing the origins and aftermath of the Rwandan
genocide).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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Hutu employee, she likely could not prevail on a claim of national origin
discrimination. Rather, under Espinoza’s narrow definition of national
origin, the promoted Tutsi employee and the passed-over Hutu employee
would be deemed to share the same Rwandan national origin. Because Title
VII only considers “Rwandan,” and not “Hutu,” as a national origin, the
Hutu employee would likely struggle to prove that the employer discriminated against her as a Hutu Rwandan where the employer consistently
promoted Tutsi Rwandans. Even where an employer showed a clear discriminatory animus against Hutus, the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis
disappears for Title VII analysis, and both would be considered “Rwandans.”
Similar subnational discrimination based primarily on regional origin
also occurred in Sudan. Since Sudan gained its independence in 1956,
“[m]ore than 2 million people have been killed . . . in the long-running war
between successive governments of the north and peoples of the south.”53 In
2003, regional tension flared in Darfur, a region in western Sudan, leading
to government-sanctioned attacks on Muslim nomads and farmers.54 Darfur,
while predominantly Muslim, includes “more than 30 ethnic groups.”55
Tension in Darfur quickly “assumed an increasingly ethnic and racist
dimension, with population groups defining themselves as Arab or Zurq.”56
As a result of these intracountry differences, over 400,000 citizens living in
Darfur died and over 2,500,000 were displaced.57 Thus, even though the
citizens shared the same Sudanese national origin, discrimination persisted
within the country’s regional subgroups, culminating in the death of
hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians.
Rwanda and Darfur are only two particularly egregious cases of subnational discrimination; other examples abound in history.58 According to one
53 See Salih Booker & Ann-Louise Colgan, Genocide in Darfur, NATION, July 12, 2004, at 8, 8
(describing the historical tension between ethnic groups in Sudan and Western inaction to prevent
genocide there).
54 See Genocide in Darfur, UNITED HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/
genocide/genocide-in-sudan.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (providing context for the religious
and ethnic strife in Darfur).
55 Tim Youngs, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 04/51: Sudan: Conflict in Darfur 7
( June 23, 2004), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2004/
rp04-051.pdf.
56 Id. at 8.
57 Genocide in Darfur, supra note 54.
58 See, e.g., Al Burke, Genocide Victims Accused of Genocide, NORDIC NEWS NETWORK ( Jan.
16, 2004), http://www.nnn.se/n-model/foreign/hmong.htm (describing a debate surrounding the
Laotian government’s genocide of the country’s Hmong ethnic minority); Dave Johns, The Crimes
of Saddam Hussein: 1988 The Anfal Campaign, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/
stories/iraq501/events_anfal.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (describing Saddam Hussein’s
campaign to eradicate the Kurdish population of northern Iraq); Myanmar/Burma, GENOCIDE
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study, there have been “no less than 58 ethnic civil wars between 1945 and
1999, constituting 51% of the total number of civil wars.”59 These examples
demonstrate that an interpretation of national origin that is based solely on
country of origin “ignore[s] the reality of ethnicity—which can encompass
race, religion, language, culture and other characteristics in formation of
personal and group identity.”60 These subnational “[d]ifferences in dress,
language, accent, and custom” are often “more likely to elicit prejudicial
attitudes than the fact of the [national] origin itself.”61 Yet, because of the
definition of national origin set forth in Espinoza, an employee would
probably fail in relying on such subnational differences to support a national
origin discrimination claim.
B. Prevalence of Subnational Discrimination
Within the United States
The prevalence of subnational discrimination is not unique to employees
who trace their national origins to subgroups within countries other than
the United States—it is also a problem within the United States. According
to one scholar, America is inherently divided because “the United States is a
federation comprised of the whole or part of eleven regional nations, some
of which truly do not see eye to eye with one another . . . and [f]ew [of
which] have shown any indication that they are melting into some sort of
unified American culture.”62 These eleven American subnations can be
divided along geographic lines, each with its own history, common culture,
and set of assumptions about politics and life.63 As a result, “[i]t is fruitless
WATCH, http://www.genocidewatch.org/myanmar.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (collecting
various news articles detailing ethnic discrimination against the Rohingya, an ethnic minority
living in western Myanmar); Brett Stone, Genocide in Australia: Report Details Crimes Against
Aborigines, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Sept. 7, 1999), http://www.wsws.org/articles/
1999/sep1999/geno-s07.shtml (describing the genocidal practices perpetrated for centuries against
Australian Aboriginals).
59 Francesco Caselli & Wilbur John Coleman II, On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict, 11 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS’N 161, 162 (Supp. 2013).
60 Cruz, supra note 15, at 164.
61 Stephen M. Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94
YALE L.J. 1164, 1165 (1985).
62 COLIN WOODARD, AMERICAN NATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE ELEVEN RIVAL REGIONAL
CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA 3 (2011); see also American Regions & Stereotypes, supra note 7
(explaining that the United States can be broken up into six unofficial regions—New England, the
Mid-Atlantic, the South, the Midwest, the Southwest, and the West—and describing the
stereotypes of Americans who live in these regions).
63 WOODARD, supra note 62, at 3. In Colin Woodard’s theory, North America has long been
divided into eleven rival, regional subnations. Id. Some of the divisions that Woodard cites are
based on the very stereotypes that serve as sources of subnational discrimination within the
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to search for the characteristics of an ‘American’ identity, because each
nation [within the United States] has its own notion of what being American should mean.”64 Regardless of whether one divides the United States
into eleven subnations or otherwise, regional differences exist and many
cases of employment discrimination stem from these differences.
The most obvious example of subnational discrimination within the
United States is the historic rivalry between the North and the South. From
clashes over slavery to a brutal civil war, the southern region of the United
States has long had a distinct identity.65 The differences between the North

United States. The first regional nation, “Yankeedom,” stretches from Puritan New England to
upstate New York and parts of the upper Midwest. Id. at 5. This nation has been “locked in nearly
perpetual combat with the Deep South for control of the federal government since the moment
such a thing existed.” Id. The second regional nation, “New Netherland,” encompasses what is now
Greater New York City and is notable for being multi-ethnic and for caring more about money
than Yankee moralizing. Id. at 6. The third regional nation, “the Midlands”—the “most ‘American’
of the nations”—was founded by Quakers and stretches from Philadelphia across the heart of the
Midwest. Id. at 6-7. The fourth regional nation, “Tidewater,” is a fundamentally conservative
region that spans the lowlands of Virginia, Maryland, southern Delaware, and northeastern North
Carolina. Id. at 7. The fifth regional nation, “Greater Appalachia,” includes the southern Midwest
and upper South. Id. at 8. Appalachia is known for its “combative culture” and deep aversion
towards “Yankee teachers, Tidewater lords, and Deep Southern aristocrats.” Id. The sixth regional
nation, the “Deep South,” spans the southern lowlands and has long “been the bastion of white
supremacy, aristocratic privilege, and a version of classical Republicanism modeled on the slave
states of the ancient world.” Id. at 9. The seventh regional nation, “New France,” covers Quebec
and the Acadian enclaves of southern Louisiana. Id. at 9-10. The eighth regional nation, “El
Norte,” spans the U.S.–Mexico border and is dominated by Hispanic language, culture, and social
norms. Id. at 10. The ninth regional nation, “the Left Coast,” located “between the Pacific and the
Cascade and Coast mountain ranges, . . . combines the Yankee faith in good government and social
reform with a commitment to individual self-exploration and discovery.” Id. at 11. The tenth
regional nation, “the Far West,” includes the entire interior west of the one-hundredth meridian
and, due to oppressive environmental conditions, has remained in a state of semi-dependency. Id.
at 12. Finally, the last regional nation, “First Nation,” is occupied by indigenous inhabitants,
including Native Americans, most of whom have never given up their land by treaty and who “still
retain cultural practices and knowledge that allow them to survive in the region on its own terms.”
Id. at 13.
64 Id. at 261. The fact that subnational differences exist within the United States is also apparent by the disagreement among courts as to whether “American” constitutes a valid national
origin in the first place. Compare Vicedomini v. Alitalia Airlines, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1381, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (rejecting the notion that “American” constitutes a national origin under
Title VII and stating that “perhaps” the only group that may claim an “American” national origin
is Native Americans), with Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig & Co., 582 F. Supp. 669, 675 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (“[E]mployment discrimination against American citizens based merely on country of birth,
whether that birthplace is the United States or elsewhere . . . is sufficient to state a Title VII cause
of action based on national origin discrimination.”).
65 See JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY 1789–1861, at 4
(1930) (“[T]he inhabitants of those states below the Mason and Dixon line always considered
themselves a separate and distinct people . . . [a]nd it was this consciousness of unity—however
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and the South are numerous. First, many Southerners66 share a unique
history in the United States because their ancestors fought the North in the
Civil War, seceded from the country, and operated their own government as
the Confederate States of America. Further, on a cultural level, Southerners
often place much greater emphasis on a “slow pace of life”67 and hold a
dominant cultural position of “[o]pposition to modernism [and] liberal
theology.”68 More so than citizens in any other region, Southerners “have
been the stronghold of biblical inerrancy; the elimination of barriers
between church and state; teaching children religious rather than scientific
explanations for the origins and nature of the universe; maintaining legal,
political, and social restraints against homosexuality, civil rights, and
interracial dating; and of preventing the secularization of society.”69
Based on these regional differences, in the twentieth century, many
Southerners were discriminated against when seeking jobs in northern cities
and forced to take jobs as semiskilled or unskilled laborers.70 Much of the
employment discrimination that Southerners have faced stems from the fact
that they are frequently associated with negative assessments of competence, intelligence, and education.71 For example, according to one study,
justified—that obliterated state boundaries and consolidated a geographic section of the Union
into a single people.”).
66 Due to the complicated history of race relations in the South, I use the term “many Southerners” to refer specifically to white Southerners who trace their heritage, at least in part, to the
Civil War era. However, it is important to note that many aspects of the southern regional identity
are shared among black Southerners and white Southerners. See Ashley Blaise Thompson,
Southern Identity: The Meaning, Practice, and Importance of a Regional Identity 212 (Aug. 2007)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University), available at http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/
available/etd-07242007-162825/unrestricted/final3.pdf ( finding that “[S]outherners, both black and
white, appear to base their regional identity claims largely on birth in the region, family ancestry
in the South, and life-long residence in the South,” but that this regional identity is “more relevant
and familiar to whites in the region than blacks,” who emphasize their racial identity before their
regional identity).
67 Id. at 214.
68 WOODARD, supra note 62, at 271.
69 Id.
70 See LEWIS M. KILLIAN, WHITE SOUTHERNERS 102-09 (Univ. of Mass. Press, rev. ed.
1985) (using a case study of a “hillbilly” colony in mid-twentieth century Chicago to show that the
phenomenon of the working class–white southern minority being stereotyped and discriminated
against in the northern city is not new, and describing how these stereotypes have negatively
impacted southerners’ job prospects).
71 See Saumya Vaishampayan, When an Accent Gets in the Way of a Job, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6,
2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2012/09/06/when-an-accent-gets-in-the-way-of-a-job (outlining
the role that accent plays in employment discrimination and explaining that southern accents
consistently received lower ratings in the category of perceived intelligence); Anders, supra note 7;
see also Thompson, supra note 66, at 29-30 (explaining that white Southerners in particular are
seen by both northern whites and blacks as “poorer, lazier, less intelligent, more likely to live off
welfare, and less patriotic” and that although “white southerners are not stereotyped to the same
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employers in seven out of fourteen northern industrial plants “stated openly
that they would hire white southern workers only when they could not get
anybody else,” explaining that “laziness, lack of education and skills, and an
overdeveloped spirit of independence made them undesirable as employees.”72 Another more recent study found that Southerners displaced by
Hurricane Katrina had a hard time finding employment outside the South.73
As one job applicant who sought employment in Colorado explained,
employers “treated her like she was ‘stupid’ and ‘uneducated’ because of her
Southern accent.”74
Despite the employment discrimination that Southern-Americans face
in the United States, a Southern-American employee would likely not have
a cognizable claim solely on the basis of the discrimination she faced as a
Southern-American. For example, imagine a Southern-American individual
is not hired and a less qualified Northern-American is hired. Because both
the hired Northern-American and the not-hired Southern-American share
the same “American” national origin, the Southern-American’s Title VII
disparate treatment national origin claim would likely fail. In other words,
employers are free to act upon their regional animus and refuse to hire
similarly qualified individuals without running afoul of Title VII.
In addition to Southerners, Americans living in the Appalachian region
of the United States have also struggled with subnational employment
discrimination.75 Although “Appalachian-Americans are not generally
degree as many . . . other racial/ethnic groups . . . such as Jews, blacks, and Hispanics . . . they are
nonetheless consistently stereotyped in a more negative manner than whites more generally”).
72 KILLIAN, supra note 70, at 108-09.
73 See Lori Peek, They Call It “Katrina Fatigue”: Displaced Families and Discrimination in Colorado,
in DISPLACED: LIFE IN THE KATRINA DIASPORA 31, 39-40 (Lynn Weber & Lori Peek eds., 2012).
74 Id. at 40. Accents are “often derivative of race and national origin” and evoke “a plethora of
both conscious and unconscious prejudices.” Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1348, 1351 (1991); see
also id. at 1351 (“When Jimmy Carter was president, many Northerners admitted that they had a
hard time believing that someone with a Georgia accent could be intelligent or well educated.”);
Rachel Rodriguez, Regional Accents Thrive in U.S.—But Is That a Good Thing?, CNN (Sept. 29,
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/29/living/american-accents-ireport (explaining that southern or
western accents “are among the most stigmatized in the United States”).
75 See generally Elizabeth E. Heilman, Hoosiers, Hicks, and Hayseeds: The Controversial Place of
Marginalized Ethnic Whites in Multicultural Education, 37 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 67 (2004)
(providing a detailed account of discrimination, including employment discrimination, against
Appalachians); Matthew H. Walker, Comment, Discrimination Based on National Origin and
Ancestry: How the Goals of Equality Have Failed to Address the Pervasive Stereotyping of the Appalachian
Tradition, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 335, 337 (2013) (detailing the employment discrimination that
Appalachians have faced throughout history and arguing that “Appalachians are a distinct cultural
group that have experienced a history of oppression and marginalization similar to that endured by
racial and ethnic minorities such as the African, Native, and Mexican Americans”).
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discussed in multicultural textbooks or thought of as a distinct cultural
group . . . they exhibit major cultural differences when compared to the
common social construct of ‘white America.’”76 Appalachians “have their
own music, history, art, tradition, literature, dialect, religious beliefs, and
ideas of ecology, justice, education and health.”77 More so than in other
regions, “[t]he family, or ‘kin’, as a working unit, is an important part of
Appalachian-America,” and “Appalachians have a strong sense of community,
even when in urban settings.”78 Unlike Northeastern-Americans, Appalachians
frown upon competitiveness and boasting—“people are expected to play
down their achievements and not act as if they are ‘above’ everyone else.”79
Additionally, “Appalachians have distinct speech patterns, usually regarded
as ‘slow drawls’” and use “colloquial words such as: ain’t (is not), y’all (you
all), y’uns (you ones or you guys), warsher (washing machine, note the ‘r’),
[and] tater (potato).”80
Stereotypes of Appalachians pervade American society, particularly in
the media. Americans frequently refer to Appalachians as “white trash” and
“trailer trash” and associate Appalachians with “ignorance, incest, inferior
genetics, [and] poor hygiene.”81 According to one nineteenth-century
commentator, Appalachians are “the laziest two legged animals that walk
erect on the face of the Earth. Even their motions are slow, and their speech
a sickening drawl . . . [They show] a natural stupidity or dullness of intellect
that almost surpasses belief.”82
These odious stereotypes of Appalachians as unintelligent hillbillies
have had particularly adverse effects on Appalachians in the employment
context. For example, “[a] twang in the voice, a quirky expression like ‘I
reckon,’ [and] a taste for banjo music . . . can lead to many other assumptions: This person is not smart, this person won’t show up on time, this
person’s temper is likely to be quick.”83 As a result, many Appalachians that
moved to big cities in search of jobs84 were discriminated against by
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Sizemore, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Heilman, supra note 75, at 68-69 (quoting an 1860 ethnography of the South and explaining that such negative social opinions about Appalachians have “carried on consistently from
colonial days to the present”) (alteration in original).
83 Judy Pasternak, Column One: Bias Blights Life Outside Appalachia, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1994, at A1.
84 See KATHRYN M. BORMAN, ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN COMMUNITIES AND SCHOOLS:
RECOGNIZING AND BUILDING ON STRENGTHS 71 (1998) (“[T]he influx of Appalachian people
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employers who either consciously or subconsciously connoted the employee’s
regional origin with ignorance.85 Employment discrimination against
Appalachians still persists in many cities.86 A study in 1998 found that the
“promise of good employment remains elusive for urban Appalachian youth
whose repertoire of skills and behaviors places them at odds with employers’
biases toward those who display a more ‘appropriate’ demeanor.”87
To combat this pervasive employment discrimination, Cincinnati
“adopt[ed] the nation’s only human rights ordinance banning discrimination
against Appalachians.”88 Outside of Ohio, however, protection of Appalachians
from subnational employment discrimination is virtually nonexistent. As
with Southerners, an Appalachian discriminated against because of her
regional origin cannot make out a prima facie case of national origin
discrimination under Title VII where the employer hired a different American,
but non-Appalachian, employee.89 Thus, even though “Appalachians are
statistically one of the most exploited and marginalised groups in America,”90 they are frequently left without recourse under Title VII simply based
upon a narrow interpretation of the term “national origin.”
Whether the discrimination is North versus South, East Coast versus
West Coast,91 Northern California versus Southern California,92 Alaskans

from rural areas to Midwestern cities following World War II was nearly as great as Irish and
Italian migration in the late 19th century and [was] in sheer numbers much greater than the
current migration of Asians to U.S. shores . . . .”).
85 See id. at 73-74 (“[N]either cultural differences nor migrant status alone or together account for this outcome. Rather, Appalachians are excluded in order to reduce competition for jobs
‘reserved’ for native, non-Appalachian whites.”).
86 See id. at 73 (noting that discrimination “persists in the current job market for urban Appalachians” in cities such as “Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati” which have
large urban Appalachian populations).
87 See id. at 74 (observing that “[e]mployers desire docile, ‘responsible’ workers who do not
have strong obligations to kin, the problems associated with young families of their own, and
whose approach to life is less spontaneous and engaged than that of many urban Appalachian . . . youths”).
88 Pasternak, supra note 83.
89 See De Volld v. Bailar, 568 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining that whatever motives
an employer “may have had in choosing between two people of the same ethnic origin, discrimination cannot have been among them”).
90 Sizemore, supra note 4.
91 See, e.g., Linton Weeks, After Quake, A New Round of Coastal Rivalry Erupts, NPR (Aug. 25,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/25/139942033/after-quake-a-new-round-of-coastal-rivalry-erupts
(describing the rivalry between the East Coast and the West Coast, which may be rooted in
cultural differences between the coasts).
92 See THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATE: NORTHERN CALIFORNIA VS. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, at xi ( Jon Winokur ed., 2004) (illustrating the cultural clash between northern California
and southern California, with “San Franciscans” looking down on “Angelenos” as inferior).
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versus Native-Alaskans,93 or the rest of the nation versus Appalachians,
various regional differences in the United States have culminated in employment discrimination. By incorrectly assuming that all Americans share
a homogeneous national origin, Espinoza’s narrow definition of national
origin fails to account for “intraethnic cultural distinctions [that] often
result in prejudice, discrimination, ethnic segregation and even attempts at
ethnocide.”94
C. Title VII’s Inconsistent Treatment of Protected Classes
In addition to erroneously assuming that nations are homogeneous, the
current definition of national origin does not explicitly affirm the Supreme
Court’s recognition in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. that
unlawful discrimination under Title VII can occur within a protected class.95
In Oncale, the Supreme Court upheld a claim for same-sex sexual harassment, explaining that “nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of
discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the
defendant . . . are of the same sex.”96 As the Supreme Court explained, “it
would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one
definable group will not discriminate against other members of their
group.”97 Similarly, “in the related context of racial discrimination in the
workplace [the Court has] rejected any conclusive presumption that an
employer will not discriminate against members of his own race.”98
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Oncale applies equally to national
origin as to sex and race. Just like sex and race discrimination can occur
among individuals that share the same gender and skin color, respectively,
national origin discrimination can—and does—occur among individuals that
share the same country of origin. Where both employer and employee trace
93 See ALASKA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACISM’S
FRONTIER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF DISCRIMINATION AND DIVISION IN ALASKA 32 (2002),
available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/ak0402/ak02.pdf (quoting an Alaskan economist who
stated, “The share of Alaska Natives employed in virtually every industry in [Alaska] is less than
their share of the population. . . . [A] 50 percent increase in Native workers would be necessary to
create parity in job holdings. In some occupations requiring higher education, a 200 percent
increase would be necessary for parity.” (alterations in original)).
94 Cruz, supra note 15, at 164.
95 See 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (“Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’
protects men as well as women, and in the related context of racial discrimination in the workplace
we have rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against
members of his own race.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
96 Id. at 79 ( first alteration in original).
97 Id. at 78 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)).
98 Id.
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their origins to the United States, such subnational discrimination typically
occurs due to the deep-rooted regional differences that have long existed
within the nation. If this issue comes before the Supreme Court, the Court
should extend its recognition that discrimination can occur within a protected class to national origin as well. Doing so would not only render Title
VII internally consistent, but also ensure that Title VII covers the many
instances of national origin discrimination that arise due to regional differences within the United States.
III. BROADENING THE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL ORIGIN TO
ENCOMPASS SUBNATIONAL DISCRIMINATION
To account for discrimination within national origin groups, both the
EEOC and courts have, over time, expanded the definition of national
origin to focus on place—rather than country—of origin. As a result, they
have permitted employees to trace their origins to subnational groups in
foreign countries. However, they have refused to recognize claims where
employees have traced their origins to subnational groups within the United
States.
A. The EEOC’s Expanded Definition of National Origin
Recognizing the problem with the presumption that nations are homogeneous, the EEOC formally expanded its interpretation of national origin in
1980 by amending its regulations “to replace ‘country of origin’ with ‘place
of origin.’”99 The EEOC did so “in order to discourage ‘reference to a
sovereign nation.’”100 Under this expanded definition, place of origin
includes not just countries and former countries, but also places that have
“never been a country, but [are] closely associated with a group of people
who share a common language, culture, ancestry, and/or other similar social
characteristics.”101 As a result, the EEOC has deemed national origin to
include “smaller ethnic groups, such as Kurds or Roma (Gypsies),” as well as
“larger ethnic groups.”102
Implicit in the EEOC’s expanded definition is a recognition that the
term “national” in national origin should not be read literally as “of a
99 Kanaji v. Child. Hosp. of Phila., 276 F. Supp. 2d 399, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,632, 85,633 (Dec. 29, 1980)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1606)).
100 Id. (citing Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg. at
85,633).
101 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 622:0002 (2002).
102 Id. § 622:0003.
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nation.” Rather, the EEOC has read “national” more broadly to include
other ethnic and geographic groups. For example, the EEOC deems
national origin to include Hispanics and Arabs, even though neither can be
traced to a single nation.
Although the EEOC has embraced multinational discrimination within
its definition of national origin, it has failed to account for subnational
discrimination, even though subnational discrimination is equally consistent
with the EEOC’s definition. According to the EEOC, a national origin
group “is a group of people sharing a common language, culture, ancestry,
and/or other similar social characteristics.”103 This definition is compatible
with the notion of subnational discrimination because subnational or
regional groups are even more likely to share common language, culture,
ancestry, and/or other similar characteristics than a nation as a whole.104
B. Courts’ Expanded Definition of National
Origin Over Time
Like the EEOC, courts have also gradually expanded their definition of
national origin in order to clarify that national origin is not governed by
principles of sovereignty. However, courts have been forced to play upon
nuances in language and subtle technicalities to account for subnational
discrimination without contradicting Espinoza. They have achieved this by
interpreting “country of origin” to subsume “place of origin” as defined by
the EEOC.
The first decision to raise the issue of subnational discrimination following
Espinoza was Roach v. Dresser Industrial Valve & Instrument Division.105 In
Roach, an American-born, Louisiana resident brought a national origin
discrimination claim against his American employer, claiming that he was
fired because of his “Acadian” or “Cajun” descent.106 Although Acadia is
not—nor ever was—a sovereign country, the court upheld the plaintiff ’s
claim for national origin discrimination, concluding that “since Acadians
historically came from the former French colony of ‘Acadia,’ today’s Nova
Scotia, this geographic link [was] enough regardless of whether such
103
104

Id. § 622:0002.
See Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 73 (2009) (“[N]ational
origin discrimination is less likely to consist of discrimination motivated by the fact that a person
or her ancestors came from a particular country, and it is much more likely to consist of discrimination based on ethnic characteristics with regional associations.”); see also supra text accompanying
note 61.
105 494 F. Supp. 215, 218 (W.D. La. 1980).
106 See id. at 216 (discussing the definition and history of the Acadian people).
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territory ever possessed political sovereignty.”107 Rooting its decision in
Title VII’s underlying purpose, the court explained that “[d]istinctions
between citizens solely because of their ancestors are odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, and we
decline to accept the argument that litigation of this sort should be governed by the principles of sovereignty.”108 Thus, the court began paving the
way toward recognizing regional discrimination within the United States.
Eight years later, the Ninth Circuit agreed that country of origin is not
limited by principles of national sovereignty. In Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters,
Inc., an employee claimed that his employer chose not to promote him
because of his Serbian ancestry and instead promoted a less senior employee.109 In defense, the employer claimed that the plaintiff was not a member
of a protected class under the national origin provision because Serbians
were “simply [an] ethnic group[] residing in the [then existing] nation of
Yugoslavia.”110 The court held that Serbians constitute a protected class
within Title VII, explaining that “Title VII cannot be read to limit ‘countries’
to those with modern boundaries, or to require their existence for a certain
time length before it will prohibit discrimination.”111 Taking into account
the legislative history and Supreme Court precedent, “[u]nless historical
reality is ignored, the term ‘national origin’ must include countries no
longer in existence.”112
Roach and Pejic support recognizing subnational discrimination claims
for two reasons. First, the cases recognized that just because a country lacks
political sovereignty or no longer exists does not mean it falls outside of the
scope of “national origin” within Title VII. This implies that Southerners
residing in what was formerly the Confederate States of America should be
able to sue on the basis of national origin discrimination, even though the
Confederacy no longer exists and was never considered a separate, sovereign
nation.113 Second, the court in Pejic recognized, in the context of Yugoslavia,
107
108
109

Cruz, supra note 15, at 178.
Roach, 494 F. Supp. at 218.
See 840 F.2d 667, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the employee’s allegations that he
was bypassed for a promotion after his employer—whose niece was married to a Croatian—
discovered that the employee was of Serbian ancestry).
110 Id. at 673.
111 Id.
112 Id. (citing Roach, 494 F. Supp. at 218).
113 Although litigation regarding the standing of the Confederacy is sparse, the Supreme
Court has refused to recognize the Confederacy as a sovereign nation in various cases involving
the doctrine of state succession. See, e.g., Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 191-92 (1877) (“Whatever
de facto character may be ascribed to the Confederate government consists solely in the fact, that it
maintained a contest with the United States for nearly four years, and dominated for that period
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that subnational tension can exist within countries. This subnational and
interethnic strife between Serbians and Croatians ultimately resulted in the
destruction of Yugoslavia as a unified nation in 1991.114 Since the court
recognized a region of Yugoslavia as a valid “national origin,” one would
logically assume courts would do the same with respect to regions of the
United States that have experienced similar subnational strife.
Consistent with Pejic, courts continued to broaden the interpretation of
national origin in the 1990s. In Janko v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority,
an employee sued, claiming that her employer terminated her “because she
is a Gypsy.”115 Although Gypsies do not come from one particular nation,
the court held that including Gypsies within the meaning of “national
origin” was consistent with Title VII’s purpose: “to prevent the majority
people from discriminating against other people based upon ethnic distinctions commonly recognized at the time of the discrimination.”116
Similarly, in Metoyer v. Kansas, an employee claimed she was “fired because of her Creole national origin in violation of Title VII.”117 Although the
plaintiff ultimately failed to establish a prima facie case, the court recognized that Creole could constitute a protected national origin.118 As the
court explained, “[u]nder the flexible McDonnell Douglas proof scheme, the
‘membership’ requirement of the prima facie case must not be taken too
literally in cases where a plaintiff ’s connection to a national group is in
dispute.”119 In other words, courts should afford plaintiffs the benefit of the
doubt in national origin discrimination cases. So long as plaintiffs can trace
their origin to some subnational group that has been subject to discrimination, they fall within a protected class for purposes of national origin
discrimination.

over a large extent of territory. When its military forces were overthrown, it utterly perished, and
with it all its enactments.”).
114 See Svetozar Stojanovic, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 337, 339
(1995) (explaining that “Yugoslavia emerged, disappeared, and rose again in two world
wars . . . marked by inter-national, inter-religious, civil, fratricidal, and even genocidal conflicts”);
see also Chuck Sudetic, Yugoslav Breakup Gains Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1991, at L3
(describing how Yugoslavia “tumbled further toward complete disintegration” when the ethnically
mixed republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for recognition as an independent state,
following the lead of Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia).
115 704 F. Supp. 1531, 1531 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
116 Id. at 1532 (citing Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)).
117 874 F. Supp. 1198, 1200 (D. Kan. 1995).
118 See id. at 1202-03 (explaining that the term Creole denotes a person of mixed French or
Spanish ancestry, which suffices as a national origin).
119 Id. (italics added) (quoting Gilbert v. Babbitt, 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 43,165, at
80,520 (D.D.C. 1993)).
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Finally, the courts’ gradual expansion of the definition of national origin
is also evident in their treatment of employment discrimination suits
brought by Native Americans. In Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, the plaintiff alleged that “because he is a
Hopi and not a Navajo, he was not considered for a position with a private
employer operating a facility on the Navajo reservation.”120 In upholding
the plaintiff ’s claim, the court held that because “different Indian tribes
were at one time considered nations . . . discrimination on the basis of tribal
affiliation can give rise to a ‘national origin’ claim under Title VII.”121
However, the Ninth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court “has in
more recent times recognized the erosion of the Indian tribes’ ‘nation’
status.”122 As a result, “even if the various tribes never enjoyed formal
‘nation’ status . . . discrimination based on one’s ancestor’s ‘place of origin’ is
sufficient to state a cause of action.”123
The Dawavendewa decision is notable because it addressed both the narrow
and broad definitions of national origin that courts have read into Espinoza.
On the one hand, Native American tribes retain a degree of sovereignty as
domestic dependent nations.124 To the extent that this limited sovereignty is
enough to constitute a “nation,” as suggested in Dawavendewa, Native
Americans would fall within Espinoza’s narrow definition of national origin.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in Dawavendewa was careful not to
base its holding solely on Native American’s quasi-sovereign status. Rather,
the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that even if Native American tribes were
never considered sovereign nations, both “case law and the regulations
interpreting Title VII” have made clear that discrimination based on “‘place
of origin’ is sufficient to state a cause of action.”125 Thus, even with regard to
Native Americans, courts have emphasized “place of origin” to clarify that
Espinoza does not limit national origin to territories with actual sovereignty.126
120 154 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Alison Etheredge, Native Americans (explaining
that the Indian Preferences exemption to Title VII permits employers on or near Native American
preservations to give preferential treatment to Native Americans, but does not specify whether
such employers may give preferential treatment based on membership in a particular tribe), in
1998–1999 Annual Survey of Title VII Decisions, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 317, at 344, 346 (2000).
121 Dawavendewa, 154 F.3d at 1120.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (“[I]t may well be doubted
whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can,
with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations.”).
125 Dawavendewa, 154 F.3d at 1120.
126 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the issue of whether national origin includes
tribal affiliation. See Onyiah v. St. Cloud State Univ., 684 F.3d 711, 718-19 (8th Cir. 2012), cert.
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C. Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Claims of Subnational
Discrimination Within the United States
Although courts’ broader reading of national origin as “place of origin”
should also cover regional discrimination within the United States, courts
have refused to extend the definition thus far. Rather, courts have continued
to treat the United States as a homogeneous place of origin. As a result,
plaintiffs may bring national origin claims against their employers based on
subnational differences only when those differences stem from outside the
United States or from Native American tribes.
One of the first strictly “regional” discrimination cases was Bronson v.
Board of Education of the City School District of Cincinnati.127 In this case, the
plaintiffs claimed that they were discriminated against on the basis of their
Appalachian national origin.128 Although plaintiffs sued under Title VI
rather than Title VII, the court looked to the Civil Rights Act as a whole to
interpret the meaning of national origin and found that Appalachians do
not constitute a protected class.129
At its core, Bronson is indistinguishable from Pejic, where the court upheld
a claim for national origin discrimination based upon the plaintiff ’s “Serbian”
descent, even though Serbia was not a sovereign nation at the time. In both
cases, the employer and employee were from the United States. Further, in
both cases, the discrimination at issue was regional—a region of Yugoslavia
in Pejic versus a region of the United States in Bronson. The court, however,
treated the cases differently because, unlike the plaintiff in Pejic, the plaintiff in Bronson could not trace his regional origin to a territory outside of the
United States. As the court explained, “[t]here is no indication that ‘national
origin’ was intended to include . . . groups such as Appalachians who do not
possess a national origin distinguishable from that of other citizens of the
United States.”130 Thus, the court in Bronson made the unrealistic assumption that “America” constitutes a homogeneous national origin.
Courts have followed Bronson’s lead in rejecting Title VII national origin
discrimination claims stemming solely from regional differences in the
United States. In Storey v. Burns International Security Services, an employee
brought a national origin discrimination suit, claiming that he was fired

denied, 133 S. Ct. 1502 (2013) (dismissing as time-barred plaintiff ’s salary discrimination claims
regarding tribal affiliation, in which plaintiff claimed he was discriminated against because he was
from the Igbo ethnic tribe in Nigeria, whereas his employer was from the Yoruba tribe).
127 550 F. Supp. 941 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
128 Id. at 944.
129 Id. at 959.
130 Id.
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from his position as a security guard because he was a “Confederate SouthernAmerican.”131 Even though Confederate Southern-Americans share a
common culture, the court ultimately held that Confederate SouthernAmerican is not a legitimate national origin for Title VII purposes.132
Elaborating on the majority’s reasoning, the concurring opinion explained
that “[w]here one cannot trace ancestry to a nation outside of the United
States, a former regional or political group within the United States, such as
the Confederacy, does not constitute a basis for a valid national origin
classification.”133
In Fowler v. Visiting Nurse Service of New York, the employee, a Southern
African-American woman, claimed that she was fired because of both her
race and her Southern national origin.134 The court rejected her national
origin claim, explaining that “regional differences among the people of this
country do not create protected classes.”135 Failing to provide an explanation
for why “Southern” does not constitute a valid national origin under Title
VII, the court instead simply concluded that “the state or region of the
United States where plaintiff was raised is irrelevant to her national origin
claim.”136 The court also made explicit its assumption that America is a
homogeneous national origin, explaining that because the plaintiff is
“American,” “she must show that she was mistreated as compared to nonAmericans”137 to defeat summary judgment on her national origin claim.
One of the most recent cases addressing the specific issue of regional
discrimination was Vitalis v. Sun Constructors, Inc.138 In Vitalis, the plaintiff
claimed that his employer—a “state-sider[]” from the United States mainland—fired him because he was a “local resident[] of St. Croix.”139 Before
131
132
133
134
135
136

390 F.3d 760, 761 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 765.
Id. at 766 (Scirica, C.J., concurring).
No. 06-4351, 2007 WL 3256129, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2007).
Id. at *4.
Id.; see also Langadinos v. Appalachian Sch. of Law, No. 05-0039, 2005 WL 2333460, at *8
(W.D. Va. Sept. 25, 2005) (deciding without providing further explanation that, in the context of a
discrimination complaint against the plaintiff ’s school, northeastern background is not a protected
trait under Title VII); Williams v. Frank, 757 F. Supp. 112, 120 (D. Mass. 1991) (concluding that
“Southerness is not a protected trait” under Title VII), aff ’d, 959 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1992).
137 Fowler, 2007 WL 3256129, at *4.
138 481 F. App’x 718 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Prevost v. Islands Mech. Contractor, Inc., No.
2008-110, 2013 WL 1091187, at *7 (D.V.I. Mar. 15, 2013) (relying on Vitalis to disallow an argument
suggesting that “locals”—residents of St. Croix—constitute a protected class based on their
national origin); Gottschalk v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 12-4531, 2013 WL 557010, at *8
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (dismissing a national origin discrimination claim based on the plaintiff ’s
Hawaiian origin because “[n]ational origin discrimination does not encompass discrimination
against someone because of their origin in a particular state or region of the United States”).
139 Vitalis, 481 F. App’x at 720-21.
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addressing the merits of the claim, the Third Circuit explained that although
Espinoza defined national origin as country of origin, “[i]n some cases . . . courts
have been willing to expand the concept of ‘national origin’ to include
claims from persons such as [C]ajuns or [S]erbs based upon the unique
historical, political and/or social circumstances of a given region.”140 Yet,
even under this broad definition, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that
“all of the local residents of St. Croix share a ‘unique historical, political
and/or social circumstance.’”141 As a result, the court dismissed the claim,
holding that “local residents of St. Croix do not constitute a protected class
based on their national origin.”142
As evident from the patchwork of case law confronting the issue, the
state of the law with respect to subnational discrimination is mixed. On the
one hand, courts have interpreted national origin more broadly as “place of
origin” on the grounds that Espinoza’s use of the phrase “country of origin”
might incorrectly imply a reference to a sovereign nation. In doing so, the
courts have recognized claims where an employee’s subnational origin—
Acadian, Creole, Gypsy, Serbian, Hopi—differs from the employer’s
American national origin.
On the other hand, courts have simultaneously failed to extend this
analysis to instances where an employer and employee are both “American,”
but differ based on their divergent regional origins within the United
States. As a result, some of the most potent forms of employment discrimination within the United States stemming from subnational differences
have been allowed to persist based solely on the flawed assumption that
America constitutes a unified place of origin.
IV. REINTERPRETING NATIONAL ORIGIN
UNDER TITLE VII
The American legal system must acknowledge that homogeneous national
origins do not exist. Regional identity provides a “sense of family and
historical identity that the nation-state often cannot produce.”143 While the
state can provide common legal and political structures, regional origin
often offers “stronger bases for group affinity stemming from a distinctive
common religion, historical experience, and, usually, ancestral language.”144
140
141
142
143

Id. at 721 (quoting Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 762 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Id.
Id.
Cruz, supra note 15, at 163 n.11 (citing Brian E. Porter, Concepts of Nationalism in History, in
GLOBAL CONVULSIONS 93, 108 (Winston A. Van Horne ed., 1997)).
144 Id.
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As a result, “national origin discrimination is less likely to consist of discrimination motivated by the fact that a person or her ancestors came from
a particular country, and it is much more likely to consist of discrimination
based on ethnic characteristics with regional associations.”145
By failing to account for subnational differences within the United
States, Title VII permits employers to discriminate on the basis of regional
differences, touting a shared “American” origin as a shield. Permitting such
discrimination contradicts the purpose of Title VII, which was intended to
protect employees from discrimination on the basis of arbitrary factors
unrelated to an employee’s job performance. Just like race and gender,
subnational origin is irrelevant to an employee’s job qualifications. Further,
subnational employment discrimination inflicts the same harms as race and
gender discrimination: “stigmatization, forced assimilation and denial of
cultural expression.”146 To redress these harms, Title VII should be broadened to include protection for the divergent, regional cultures that exist in
the United States.
A. “Ethnic Trait” Discrimination
One possible solution to account for subnational differences is for Congress to amend Title VII to include the prohibition of ethnicity discrimination.147 The term ethnicity consists of “ethnic traits that may include, but are
not limited to: race, national origin, ancestry, language, religion, shared
history, traditions, values, and symbols.”148 Under this approach, a plaintiff
could bring a Title VII claim based on her ethnicity without having to trace it
to either a particular country or geographic subregion. While such an approach
would be a step in the right direction, it is problematic for two reasons.
First, amending Title VII to cover discrimination based on “ethnic
traits” without any geographic limitation whatsoever would render national
origin overly broad and amorphous. As scholars proposing this amendment
concede, ethnicity is difficult to define because it incorporates a variety of
different traits.149 “Ethnic identity” can refer to any combination of traits,
including origin, solidarity, personal integrity, cultural uniqueness, and

145
146
147

Oliveri, supra note 104, at 73.
Cruz, supra note 15, at 186.
See Perea, supra note 13, at 860 (arguing that “Congress should add terms [to Title VII]
protecting against discrimination because of ‘ancestry’ and ‘ethnic traits’”); see also Cruz, supra note
15, at 180-81 (criticizing Title VII’s failure to remedy intraethnic discrimination and recognize
possible cultural heterogeneity across national origin groups).
148 Perea, supra note 13, at 833.
149 Id.
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territorial integrity, among countless others.150 Further, ethnicity is a
constantly evolving concept. “Just as ethnic groups evolve through interaction with other distinct ethnicities, ethnic groups also change because of
internal cultural subgroupings. In a sense, ethnicity serves as the forum in
which cultural dialectics interact, not merely between the ethnic group and
outsiders, but also within the group itself.”151
Given the evolving nature of ethnicity and the fact that it evades clear
definition, amending Title VII to include ethnic traits would open the
floodgates of litigation and leave the courts struggling to ascertain the
statute’s limits. Facing conflicting claims over which traits are essential to a
group’s identity, courts would be left to embark on an ethnographic immersion that could not be attained by simply reviewing court filings, exhibits,
and expert testimony. Moreover, making such a judgment would run the
risk that “recognizing cultural rights would . . . solidify one version of the
group’s identity over others and bolster the notion that groups have essences,”152
thereby codifying the boundaries of ethnic identities into precedent.
Second, amending Title VII to protect against discrimination based on
ethnic traits would lead to inherent overlap within the statute. Ethnicity is
comprised of various traits, such as race and religion,153 which are already
separately actionable under Title VII. Thus, amending Title VII to include
“ethnic traits” would serve to conflate national origin with the other protected classes delineated in the statute. This would contradict the legislative
history of Title VII, which makes clear that Congress viewed national origin
as its own protected class, distinguishable from both race and religion. As
Congressman Dent stated during a floor debate on Title VII: “National
origin . . . has nothing to do with color, religion, or the race of an individual.”154
An ethnic traits amendment would also lead to overlap within the statute
because Title VII already covers trait discrimination when the trait at issue
is used as a proxy for national origin. For example, Title VII case law has
established that denying an individual employment because of the individual’s
manner of speaking or accent constitutes unlawful discrimination where the

150

EUGEEN E. ROOSENS, CREATING ETHNICITY: THE PROCESS OF ETHNOGENESIS 19

(1989).
151
152

Cruz, supra note 15, at 171.
Roberto J. Gonzalez, Note, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in Disparate
Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2198 (2003).
153 See supra text accompanying note 148.
154 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 (1964); see also Perea, supra note 13, at 818. Although Congressman
Dent’s statement is an exaggeration—since there will inevitably be some degree of overlap
between protected classes—it makes clear that Congress viewed national origin as distinguishable
from both race and religion, warranting its own independent protection.
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accent marks the employee as being from another country.155 Similarly, both
the EEOC and courts have held that English-only rules in the workplace
violate Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination where
English is not a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).156 Since traits
such as language and accent are already actionable when they are used as
proxies for national origin, an ethnic traits amendment would be unhelpful
in addressing the shortcomings of Title VII’s national origin provision.
In defense of the ethnic traits approach, scholars counter that proxies are
insufficient because courts differ widely on which traits can serve as proxies
for a protected category and on the required degree of correlation between
the trait and the protected class.157 Therefore, they argue, discrimination
based on ethnic traits should be prohibited directly, rather than only
indirectly when such traits are used as proxies for national origin.158
Although proxies require courts to make nuanced determinations based
on correlations, they have more potential for uniform application than a
direct prohibition on ethnic trait discrimination. Since Title VII was
enacted, courts have consistently made difficult decisions based on correlations. For example, in all disparate impact cases, courts must determine
whether the correlation between an employment practice and its statistically
greater impact on a protected class leads to an inference of discrimination.159
Similarly, in the context of BFOQs, courts must determine whether a
protected trait is sufficiently correlated with job performance to qualify as a
valid BFOQ.160 Thus, although complexities are inherent in using correlations,
155 See STEVEN C. KAHN ET AL., LEGAL GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES § 2.01(9), at 2-5
(1994) (explaining that discrimination on the basis of “accent” could be considered national origin
discrimination where the accent is also a proxy for national origin, unless the employer can show
that the accent interferes with the employee’s ability to perform the job).
156 See id.; Smith, supra note 14, at 21.
157 Perea, supra note 13, at 852.
158 Id. at 853.
159 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 (1977) (explaining that
while the disparity between 3.7% (the percentage of black teachers hired by the school) and 5.7%
(the percentage of black teachers in the county) would not be enough to give rise to an inference
of discrimination, a disparity between 3.7% and 15.4% (the percentage of black teachers in the city)
might be); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
statistical disparity between men and women in commission jobs was not enough to lead to an
inference of discriminatory intent because Sears offered evidence of nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparity, such as the fact that women were simply not interested in commission
jobs).
160 See, e.g., Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414-17 (1985) (holding that an employer may use a protected trait as a legitimate proxy for job qualification “by proving that it is
‘impossible or highly impractical’ to deal with the . . . employees on an individualized basis” and
noting as an example that an employer could show that “some members of the discriminatedagainst class possess a trait precluding safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained
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courts have dealt with these issues in various areas of employment discrimination law and could do the same with respect to national origin.161
B. Regional Discrimination
In order to both account for discrimination within the United States and
provide the courts with manageable limits, national origin discrimination
should be reinterpreted to include regional discrimination. Under this
proposal, a plaintiff would need to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer discriminated against her because of her “place of
origin,” which would include regions within the United States. This would
permit a plaintiff to file a cause of action even where an employer and
employee are both American, so long as the plaintiff asserts that she was
discriminated against as a result of her being from a distinct region of the
United States.
To make out a prima facie case, plaintiffs would have to show that the
region of the United States where they are from has a unique history,
culture, and political or social circumstance that is distinguishable from
others in the United States. This inquiry would entail many of the same
factors considered in determining ethnicity, but unlike the ethnic traits
approach, the inquiry here would remain geographically circumscribed.
Embracing regional discrimination within the meaning of national
origin would have four main benefits. First, a regional discrimination
approach would affirm, consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition in
Oncale, that unlawful discrimination can occur within a protected class.162
Just as courts have recognized that sex discrimination can occur between
individuals of the same sex163 and that race discrimination can occur between

by means other than knowledge of the applicant’s membership in the class” (citations omitted));
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (holding that the employer failed to produce
sufficient evidence correlating its height and weight requirements with the requisite amount of
strength it thought essential to good job performance).
161 Even if the complexities associated with using proxies seem too burdensome for courts to
grapple with, the issues posed by a direct prohibition of ethnic trait discrimination would be far
more onerous. Under such an approach, courts would have to trace identified traits to a notion of
ethnicity that is inherently vague and lacks any identifiable boundaries. Another approach is
needed that will account for the existence of subnational discrimination and provide courts with
external limits.
162 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining that Title VII also protects against
intraracial discrimination in the workplace).
163 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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individuals of the same race,164 the courts must also recognize that national
origin discrimination can occur between individuals from the same country
of origin.
Second, regional discrimination falls within the literal meaning of “place
of origin” as embraced by the EEOC and courts following Espinoza.165
Although courts have refused to extend the definition this far, there is no
logical reason to recognize national origin claims based on subnational
differences outside the United States (e.g., Serbian, Acadian), but not
subnational differences within the United States (e.g., Appalachian). In fact,
if place of origin means what courts have said it means—that, after Espinoza,
national origin is not contingent on sovereignty—then this would favor
including regions of the United States within the meaning of national origin.
Third, recognizing regional discrimination comports with the overarching
purpose of Title VII, which seeks to remove artificial bars to employment
based on immutable characteristics.166 Like any other national origin, being
born in a particular region of the United States has no inherent relation to
one’s ability to perform a job and is completely outside an individual’s
control. There is no reason why employers should be permitted to discriminate against qualified employees based solely on regional stereotypes,
simply because those employees cannot trace their regional origin to
territories outside the United States.
Finally, a regional origin approach would provide the courts with the
objectively identifiable limits that are lacking in the ethnicity approach. By
requiring a plaintiff to point to a particular geographic region of the United
States and prove that this region has a distinct culture, a regional approach
would help circumscribe what would otherwise be an unguided journey into
the evolving and undefined concept of ethnicity. Although it would ultimately be up to the courts to decide how expansively to read the term
“region,” the presumption should be in favor of a narrower reading, including
at least those regions of the United States in which there is a welldocumented history of regional animus (e.g., the South and Appalachia).167
In this way, regional origin splits the difference between the restrictive
164 See Walker v. Sec’y of Treasury, IRS, 713 F. Supp. 403, 406-08 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (recognizing
a Title VII discrimination claim by a light-skinned black employee against her dark-skinned black
supervisor); supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
166 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“What is required by Congress
[through Title VII] is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.”).
167 See supra Section II.B.
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definition of national origin in Espinoza and the virtually limitless definition
posed by an ethnic traits approach. On the one hand, it recognizes that,
consistent with Oncale, discrimination can occur within a national origin
group, and it provides redress to the countless Americans that have faced
discrimination in employment on the basis of subnational differences. On
the other hand, it avoids rendering “national origin” so broad that courts
will be flooded with claims of ethnic discrimination and forced to make
controversial determinations of what ethnicity means for purposes of Tile VII.
While a regional discrimination approach serves as a middle ground between two extreme approaches, it is not a perfect solution. Just as the
national origin provision currently fails to account for differences within the
United States, regional discrimination would inevitably fail to account for
differences within certain regions of the United States. However, as a
practical matter, the line must be drawn somewhere. Without some geographically imposed limitation, U.S. courts would be forced to delve into a
complex ethnographic immersion.168 Until scholars develop a clear notion of
what ethnicity is and a uniform approach to identify it, the regional discrimination approach will remain the most viable solution to addressing the
problem of subnational discrimination within the United States.
CONCLUSION
The problem of discrimination based on regional origin is deeply rooted
in our nation’s history and persists today. Though some may believe that
America is a singular, homogeneous nation, the reality is that our nation—like
many others—is comprised of regional subgroups, each sharing a different
history, culture, and dialect. For too long, discrimination among these American subgroups has been permitted based on the flawed assumption that
nations are homogeneous. Although the EEOC and the courts have moved in
the right direction by rejecting the focus on a sovereign nation and broadening national origin to include “place of origin,” they have not gone far enough.
To fully account for the discrimination that occurs among Americans,
Title VII must be interpreted to include regional discrimination. The courts
should do so by extending “place of origin” one step further to include
regional origin. While this proposal would not cover every distinct, subnational group within the United States, it would cover the most pervasive
and documented form of subnational discrimination, which continues to be

168

See supra Section IV.A.
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based on region.169 Further, using “region,” instead of “ethnic traits,” would
ensure that national origin remains geographically circumscribed. Without
this sort of geographic limitation, the floodgates of litigation would open,
and the courts would be left struggling to define Title VII around a notion
of ethnicity that is, by definition, amorphous and constantly evolving.
The time has come to extend protection to the countless employees who
have been denied employment opportunities simply because they are
viewed as “Yankees,” “hillbillies,” “Confederates,” “redskins,” or “rednecks.”
Until courts formally recognize that this form of subnational origin discrimination persists within the United States, the overarching goal of Title VII—to
prevent arbitrary discrimination in employment—will remain unfulfilled.

169 See Oliveri, supra note 104, at 73 (“[N]ational origin discrimination is less likely to consist
of discrimination motivated by the fact that a person or her ancestors came from a particular
country, and it is much more likely to consist of discrimination based on ethnic characteristics with
regional associations.”).

